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Abstract 
The contingent liabilities of a sovereign, such as guarantees of the 
debts of third parties, can normally be kept off the balance sheet of the sovereign 
guarantor.  That is their charm.  As the debt to GDP ratios of many developed 
countries approach red-zone levels, contingent liabilities are increasingly being 
favored over direct, on-the-balance-sheet, borrowings.   
But what happens if a country carrying large contingent liabilities 
needs to restructure its debt?  The borrower dare not leave its contingent claims out 
of the restructuring.  To do so would risk undermining the financial predicates of the 
sovereign’s economic recovery program should the beneficiaries of the guarantees 
demand payment in full after the restructuring closes. 
Attempting to shoehorn sovereign contingent liabilities into a debt 
restructuring, however, is a particularly challenging task.  There are few precedents 
for how to do so, and no good precedents.  The explosion in the size of contingent 
sovereign obligations since the financial crisis began in 2008 inevitably means that 
these issues will need to be confronted sooner or later, probably sooner. 
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  It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a sovereign borrower in 
possession of an uncomfortably large stock of debt must be in want of camouflage.  
And since the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008, many sovereigns seem 
to have found it -- in the form of contingent sovereign liabilities.   
In every situation where a sovereign lends its credit support to 
facilitate a borrowing by a third party, the sovereign will have had a choice.  The 
alternative to guaranteeing the debt of the third party is for the sovereign to borrow 
the money in its own name and on-lend the proceeds to that entity.  The difference is 
that a direct liability appears on a sovereign’s own balance sheet; a contingent 
liability probably will not.  In the last five years, as the need to finance Great 
Recession stimulus measures has swollen the debt-to-GDP ratios of many developed 
countries, sovereigns have sought to camouflage the true extent of their liabilities by 
resorting to the issue of contingent, rather than direct, obligations.
1
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1
 See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., State Debt Guarantees That are Hidden Add to Worries in Europe, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013; Christopher Spink, Contingent Sovereign Liabilities a ‘Landmine’, INT’L 
FINANCING REV., May 26, 2012; David Reilly, Time to End the Fiction of ‘Frannie’, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 21, 2012.  Mr. Reilly, in his piece, writes:   
That [a new requirement that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay all 
of their profit to the U.S. Government as a dividend] bolsters the 
argument that Fannie and Freddie should be included on the 
government’s balance sheet.  Of course, that is politically 
unpalatable:  The inclusion of their combined $5.3 trillion in 
liabilities would balloon the nearly $16 trillion in total federal 
debt outstanding and breach the debt ceiling. 
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I.  Sovereign Comfort 
A benignant sovereign may bestow its credit support to a third party 
in a variety of ways. 
(a) Explicit sovereign guarantees 
At one end of the spectrum will be an explicit contractual guarantee 
by the sovereign expressed in words like these: 
The Republic hereby unconditionally and irrevocably 
guarantees (as primary obligor and not merely as 
surety) the punctual payment when due, whether at 
stated maturity, by acceleration or otherwise, of all 
obligations of the Obligor now or hereafter existing 
under this Agreement…. 
Such an explicit guarantee will sometimes come with all the trappings of an 
independent, separately enforceable, legal obligation on the part of the sovereign 
guarantor -- representations, covenants, waiver of sovereign immunity, choice of 
foreign governing law, submission to foreign court jurisdiction and appointment of 
an agent for service of process abroad. 
Explicit sovereign guarantees may also be extended by operation of 
law.  Some (but only some) deposit insurance schemes benefit from the full faith and 
credit of the host sovereign.  In some countries, certain state-owned enterprises will 
by law carry the full faith and credit of their sovereign in their borrowing activities. 
(b) Implicit sovereign assurances 
The other side of the spectrum of sovereign credit support consists of 
nothing more than a background shadow; a figurative -- perhaps even a literal -- 
wink, nod and reassuring smile to the prospective investor.  These are normally 
situations in which the primary obligor is so closely associated with the sovereign in 
the mind of the market (such as a political sub-division or an important state-owned 
enterprise) that lenders to the primary obligor are passively encouraged in the belief 
that the sovereign could never tolerate a circumstance in which the primary obligor 
tarnishes the reputation of the sovereign by defaulting on its debts.  Nothing is ever 
said openly about sovereign credit support in these situations, but the perceptive 
investor is expected to see the warm arm of the sovereign wrapped in a reassuring 
manner around the shoulder of the debtor. 
(c) In between 
Between these two extremes of unambiguously explicit sovereign 
guarantees and gauzily implicit sovereign reassurances are many gradations.  These 
include: 
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 partial guarantees --  the sovereign agrees to cover only a portion 
of the amount payable by the primary obligor; 
 indemnities -- the sovereign agrees to indemnify the creditor for 
any residual loss but only after all efforts to recover the debt from 
the primary obligor have been exhausted; 
 keepwells -- the sovereign’s promise to the lender is limited to an 
undertaking that the primary obligor will at all times have a 
positive net worth (often expressed as a nominal amount), but the 
sovereign is free to achieve this objective of solvency in any way 
it wishes (by recapitalizing the primary obligor, assuming or 
paying some of its debts, lending money to the primary obligor, 
etc.); and 
 comfort letters -- an aptly-named instrument, the comfort letter, in 
its most innocuous form, merely assures the lender that the 
sovereign is aware that the primary obligor is borrowing the 
money, that the sovereign does not object to the transaction and 
that the obligor continues to enjoy the affections of the sovereign. 
The remainder of this paper will deal only with explicit sovereign 
guarantees.  For obvious reasons, it is impossible to identify or quantify implicit 
guarantees because they exist only in the eye of the beholder.
2
 
II.  Contingent Charms 
The principal charm (for the guarantor) of a contingent obligation lies 
precisely in its contingent nature; no one can be sure, at the time the debt is incurred, 
whether it will be paid by the primary obligor without recourse to the guarantor.  
This feature allows guarantors, with the blessing of the accounting profession, to 
treat the resulting liabilities as off balance sheet unless and until something happens 
down the road that makes it probable that the guarantee will in fact be called.  For 
sovereigns already groaning under dangerously bloated debt-to-GDP ratios, this 
accounting treatment allows the sovereign to continue to raise capital on the strength 
of the sovereign’s credit standing while not visibly increasing the size of the 
sovereign’s own stock of debt.  The only catch is that the loans must be directed in 
the first instance to a third party (the primary obligor) under the cover of the 
                                                 
2
 This vagueness about whether a particular loan does or does not enjoy the credit support of the 
sovereign carries its own risks.  In a distressed debt context, a lender that thinks itself the beneficiary 
of an implicit sovereign guarantee is apt to howl if the sovereign orphans the primary obligor and 
allows the loan to go into default.  The United Arab Emirates, burnt by just this reaction during the 
Dubai financial crisis of 2009, subsequently changed its policy to ensure that there would be no future 
misunderstandings about which loans to state-linked enterprises did, and which did not, enjoy 
government support.  See Camilla Hall, Abu Dhabi Tightens Rules for Debt Issued to State-Linked 
Businesses, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2012 at 15. 
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sovereign guarantee.  That third party may be related to the sovereign (a state-owned 
enterprise for example), or it may be a private sector entity whose activities the 
sovereign wishes to encourage.  A construction project undertaken by a private 
sector entity in the tourism industry is a good example. 
Accounting standards differ somewhat in how they describe the 
circumstances which allow a guarantor to keep a contingent liability off of its own 
balance sheet.  For corporate borrowers, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IAS 37) directs that if a present obligation “may, but probably will not, 
require an outflow of resources” from the guarantor, it need not be “recognized” on 
the balance sheet of the guarantor, but should be disclosed in financial statements as 
a contingent liability.
3
  Where the likelihood of an outflow of resources from the 
guarantor is “remote”, even the need for financial disclosure is omitted.4   
The general principle established by Eurostat (the statistical office of 
the European Union) for presenting the accounts of EU member states is broadly 
similar.  As long as a state guarantee is not called by beneficiary, the liability is 
recorded only on the balance sheet of the primary obligor, not the sovereign.
5
  
Eurostat recognizes a “special case” exception to this general principle in situations 
where need for the government to make debt service payments on the loan is open 
and notorious from the outset.  The Eurostat Manual describes the circumstances in 
these terms: 
Even though the liability is issued by the enterprise 
itself, it may be right away considered with certainty as 
an actual government liability if the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
- the law authorizing issuance of the debt specifies the 
government’s obligation of repayment. 
- the budget of the State specifies each year the amount of 
repayment. 
- this debt, issued by the enterprise, is systematically repaid by the 
State (interest and principal). 
The liability must then be recorded directly -- as soon as at issuance -- 
in the government financial account and balance sheet, and not in the 
enterprise’s.  Its amount must be taken into account in the government 
debt.
6
   
                                                 
3
 IASB Guidance on implementing IAS 37, Tables, Provisions and Contingent Liabilities. 
4
  IAS 37, para. 28 
5
 Eurostat, ESA95 Manual for Government Deficit and Debt (2002 ed.), II.4.3.2(1). 
6
 Id., II.4.3.2(2) 
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A Note on the Database 
The statistical information in this paper is based on our 
survey of sovereign guaranteed bonds issued between 
January 1, 1965 and July 1, 2013, as those bonds 
appear on three publicly-available databases (Dealogic, 
Perfect Information, Thomson One Banker).
7
  The 
prospectuses and offering circulars for a total of 885 
sovereign guaranteed bonds appearing on these 
databases were reviewed. 
This is not the total universe of sovereign guaranteed 
bonds.  The databases we use are commercial and 
therefore usually include only those bonds that the 
database operators believe will be of interest to paying 
customers.  Our information suggests that those 
customers tend to be foreign rather than local investors 
(domestic investors are often less concerned with legal 
terms, having other mechanisms to police and monitor 
the behavior of their sovereign). In other words, what 
we report on is probably both a small and biased 
(towards the interests of foreign investors) subset of 
the universe of sovereign guaranteed bonds, the exact 
size of which is entirely a matter of speculation. 
We nevertheless believe that our results reveal the 
general trends in the issuance of these instruments over 
time, particularly in the areas of greatest relevance to 
the subject of this paper -- number of issuances 
(relative to direct sovereign bonds), governing law, 
submission to court jurisdiction and waiver of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
 
  
                                                 
7
 We also examined the bonds available from Bloomberg, a fourth data source.  However, there were 
no bonds there that we had not already accessed from one of the other databases. 
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III.  The Explosion of 2008 - 2012 
 
The data we have reviewed suggests that there was literally an 
explosion in the number of sovereign guaranteed bonds issued after the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008, particularly in Europe.  Using publicly-available information 
(see box -- “A Note on the Data Base”), the results are shown on Figure 1:   
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Figure 1: Number of Bonds with Sovereign 
Guarantees   
Jan 1, 1965 - July 1, 2013 (n=885) 
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Figure 2 reports a different, but equally striking, perspective -- it 
focuses on the bonds and guarantees for the six euro area nations that were generally 
perceived to be at the heart of the crisis starting in late 2009 – Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Belgium.  These are also the six early entrants to the European 
Monetary Union who have not traditionally been AAA rated (in contrast to, for 
example, Germany and France).  For these six nations, Figure 2 reports both the 
numbers of sovereign bonds and guaranteed bonds issued during the quarter century 
between January 1, 1988 and July 1, 2013.  As the European crisis worsens during 
the 2009-2012 period, the issuance of guaranteed bonds, particularly in comparison 
to regular sovereign bonds, mushrooms.  
 
 
An excellent study released by Houlihan Lokey in May 2012
8
 
concluded that sovereign loan/bond guarantees in Europe as of end-2010 (a category 
that did not include other forms of sovereign contingent exposure such as umbrella 
guarantees or deposit insurance schemes) represented, on a GDP-weighted average, 
13.1% of European GDP.  In some countries, contingent exposure approached 30 
percent of GDP.  The trend noted in the Houlihan study was upward; the aggregate 
size of guarantees outstanding in 2013 is undoubtedly significantly larger than it was 
in 2010. 
                                                 
8
 Houlihan Lokey, The Increasing Risks Posed by Contingent Liabilities:  How to Measure and 
Manage Them, Presentation at the 2012 Meeting of the Private Sector with the Paris Club and with 
Representatives of Non Paris Club Bilateral Creditors, available at http://www.iif.com/emp/dr/ 
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There are two explanations for this dramatic rise in the popularity of 
contingent sovereign obligations.  The first, as discussed above, is the desire of over-
indebted developed countries to minimize further strains on their debt-to-GDP ratios.  
The off balance sheet accounting treatment of contingent obligations permits this.  
The second explanation relates to the methods by which the European Central Bank 
has been prepared to provide liquidity assistance to banks in the Eurozone.  A bank 
in need of liquidity may either borrow money directly from the ECB’s discount 
window by posting eligible collateral for the loan, or the bank may borrow the funds 
from its own central bank through the Emergency Lending Assistance (“ELA”) 
program.  ELA funds, however, are ultimately also sourced from the ECB and the 
Eurosystem and require the posting of eligible collateral by the borrowing bank. 
Peripheral European banks that had exhausted their store of eligible 
collateral for these programs came up with an ingenious solution -- they 
manufactured eligible collateral.
9
  The bank issues a debt instrument to itself (there is 
no third party purchaser of the instrument), takes the instrument to its local ministry 
of finance and obtains a government guarantee, and then uses the instrument as 
collateral for a new borrowing from ECB’s discount window or the ELA.10 
In July 2012, the ECB is reported to have grown alarmed at the size of 
the manufactured collateral that it was accepting at its discount window.  The ECB 
accordingly capped the amount of “specially tailored bonds” that could be used for 
this purpose by Eurozone banks at the level each bank had outstanding at the time 
the new policy was announced.
11
 
  
                                                 
9
 The Cypriot Ministry of Finance charmingly refers to instruments issued for the sole purpose of 
ECB/ELA discounting as “collateral for liquidity extraction from the European Central Bank.”  
Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Public Debt Management Annual Report 2011 (March 
2012) at 35. 
10
 See Sonia Sirletti & Elisa Martinuzzi, Italy Banks said to Use State-Backed Bonds for ECB Loans, 
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-20/italian-banks-
are-said-to-use-state-guaranteed-bonds-to-receive-ecb-loans.html 
11
 See Marc Jones, ECB Caps Use of State-Backed Bonds as Collateral, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKBRE8620V920120703; Joseph Cotterill, ECB 
Collateral Shift Du Jour, FT ALPHAVILLE, July 3, 2012, available at 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/03/1070271/ecb-collateral-shift-du-jour/.  
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IV.  Precedents 
 
One of the remorseless laws of sovereign debt management is that 
size brings risk.  If a component of a sovereign’s debt stock is of negligible size, that 
component can sometimes escape a debt restructuring.  For example, with only a 
couple of exceptions, sovereign bonds were not restructured in the 1980s debt crisis.  
The reason?  Emerging market sovereign bond issues were rare in the period before 
the crisis began in 1982 and the cost/benefit analysis weighed heavily in favor of 
exempting those few bonds from the restructurings that engulfed commercial bank 
loans and bilateral credits in that decade.  But by the late 1990s, bonds had replaced 
bank loans as the main component of the debt stocks of many emerging market 
countries.  Bond restructurings therefore became inevitable in countries with 
insupportable debt loads. 
If this remorseless law is indeed remorseless, it suggests that any 
country carrying a significant stock of contingent sovereign obligations will 
eventually need to address those liabilities if a generalized restructuring of the 
country’s debt becomes necessary.  Unfortunately, there are few historical 
precedents to guide such an exercise. 
In the sovereign debt restructurings of the 1980s, the aggregate 
number of sovereign guarantees was small.  This allowed them to be ignored in the 
debt workouts of that era.  The normal approach was to include a contingent liability 
in the restructuring only if the beneficiary called on the guarantee before the 
restructuring closed.  But no pressure was placed on beneficiaries to call on their 
guarantees.  This set a precedent that has been followed in most sovereign debt 
restructurings of the last thirty years.
12
 
One notable exception was Grenada’s restructuring in 2005 where the 
government’s contingent exposure equaled about 10% of its direct liabilities.  
Grenada warned in the disclosure document for its restructuring that any contingent 
obligation called by a beneficiary after the restructuring closed would be settled by 
the delivery of consideration having a net present value equal to what the lender 
would have received had the guarantee been called in time to be included in the main 
restructuring.
13
 
  
                                                 
12
 See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Treatment of Contingent Liabilities in a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, in FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTAINMENT AND GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES (J. LaBrosse, R. 
Olivares-Caminal, & D. Singh eds., 2013). 
13
 See Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpenski, Grenada’s Innovations, 2006 J. INT’L BANKING AND 
REG., at 227, 231. 
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The most recent precedent, Greece in 2012, is mixed.  Although the 
Hellenic Republic had hundreds of outstanding state guarantees at the time it 
announced its debt restructuring in February of 2012, only 36 of those instruments 
were made eligible for inclusion in the workout.
14
  The distinguishing characteristic 
of the included instruments was that they fell within Eurostat’s “special cases” 
exception to the general rule of off balance sheet treatment.
15
  In effect, Eurostat had 
already concluded that the liabilities were central government debt and had to be 
shown as such for Eurostat reporting purposes.  Accordingly, they were also made 
eligible for the restructuring of the central government’s direct debt. 
Interestingly, although the main Greek debt restructuring was 
facilitated by Greek legislation which retrofit a collective action mechanism on that 
portion of the debt stock governed by Greek law (93% of the total), this legislation 
did not attempt to sweep in the Greek Government guarantees of the guaranteed 
bonds that were declared eligible for the restructuring, nor did the Greek legislature 
attempt to pass separate legislation dealing with the Government’s local law 
guarantees.  The Greek authorities therefore avoided the legal and operational 
complications (described below in Part VI of this paper) that would have attended an 
attempt to restructure sovereign guarantees in a more coercive way.  
V.  The Restructurer’s Dilemma 
If a country that is forced to restructure its outstanding (direct) 
indebtedness also has a significant amount of contingent obligations coming due 
during the period covered by that restructuring, there are a limited number of 
options: 
(i) hope that the primary obligor will have the resources to pay the 
debt without a call on the guarantee; 
(ii) hope that the beneficiary of the guarantee will voluntarily roll 
over the debt at maturity; 
(iii) honor the guarantee if it is called by paying the debt in full; and 
(iv) dishonor the guarantee and attempt to restructure the liability 
when it matures. 
Option (i) is, of course, the sovereign’s preferred choice.  But a 
natural selection process is always at work in guarantees.  Had the primary obligor 
been perceived as fully creditworthy on its own, it would not have needed sovereign 
credit support in order to raise capital at a tolerably low interest rate.  The very 
                                                 
14
 Twenty series of these guaranteed bonds (totaling €4.88 billion) were governed by Greek law; the 
other sixteen series (totaling €4.97 billion) were governed by foreign law. 
15
 See text accompanying note 6 above. 
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presence of a sovereign guarantee is thus a sign that the primary obligor might not be 
good for the money when it comes due. 
Option (ii), a voluntary rollover, is the sovereign’s second best choice.  
Naturally, this requires the cooperation of either an indulgent, or a captive, 
beneficiary.  The “liquidity extraction bonds” (see footnote 9 below) that have been 
issued by European banks for the purpose of accessing the ECB’s discount window 
or the ELA program presumably fall into the category of “captive beneficiary”.  
Demanding repayment of the loan to the discounting bank on its maturity date 
would, in most of these situations, be pointless.  Demanding payment from the 
sovereign guarantor of the guaranteed bonds pledged to secure the loan would be 
inconsistent with the official sector’s bailout program for the country.  The result is a 
captive beneficiary that has little choice but to roll over the loan and the 
accompanying collateral for the loan. 
Option (iii), pay up, can have several problems. The first, of course, is 
money, a commodity that is rarely in abundant supply when a sovereign is compelled 
to restructure its debts.  Even if the cash is available, paying in full the beneficiary of 
a state guarantee while all of the sovereign’s direct creditors have been forced to take 
losses will naturally delight the former and enrage the latter.  Finally, it is unlikely 
that the financial predicates underlying the restructuring will have assumed payment 
in full of maturing contingent liabilities during the adjustment period.  If those 
contingent liabilities are of a significant size, a policy of paying them may torpedo 
the entire program. 
Option (iv), attempt an ad hoc restructuring of a contingent liability 
when it matures, raises the predicable issues of feasibility, cost and intercreditor 
equity.  It would also inevitably prolong the perception that the country remains 
mired in a debt crisis. 
The restructuring of a contingent obligation is more complicated than 
the same exercise for direct sovereign debt.  For one thing, until the guarantee is 
called by the beneficiary, it remains contingent; the guarantor is rarely in a position 
to force such a call.  This gives the beneficiary the option of attempting to ride out 
the sovereign’s restructuring of its direct obligations in the hope that after that main 
restructuring closes, the sovereign will be reluctant to plunge back into another debt 
crisis by dishonoring a call on the guarantee. 
Moreover, even if beneficiaries can be persuaded to call upon their 
guarantees, they are in a fundamentally different position from the sovereign’s direct 
creditors.  By definition, the holder of a sovereign guaranteed bond benefits from the 
credit of both the primary obligor and that of the sovereign guarantor; in the jargon, 
the creditor is holding “two-name paper”.  Giving such a creditor the same deal as 
that offered to direct creditors of the sovereign would effectively attribute no value to 
the credit of the primary obligor.  But any attempt to sweeten the terms of the 
restructuring for contingent sovereign creditors in order to compensate those holders 
for the surrender of their claim against the primary obligor requires someone to put a 
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monetary value on that second credit risk.  This could be a delicate and politically 
sensitive task when the primary obligor is a state-owned or controlled enterprise. 
In short, the restructurer’s dilemma is that contingent liabilities, if 
they are of any material size, cannot safely be left out of a sovereign debt 
restructuring, nor can they easily be included in a sovereign debt restructuring.  This 
problem wasn’t a problem for so long as contingent liabilities represented only a 
small part of the debt stocks of affected countries.  But for many countries, that 
period ended with the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008.  The problem 
will therefore be unavoidable in at least some of the sovereign debt restructurings yet 
to come. 
In the bankruptcy of a corporate borrower in the United States (let’s 
call it Acme Corporation), the value of any contingent claims against Acme that are 
not expected to be crystalized before the bankruptcy proceeding ends may be 
estimated for purposes of allowing the beneficiary’s claim to be filed in the 
insolvency proceeding.  (See U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 502(c)(1).)  This is done to 
avoid unduly prolonging the administration of Acme’s estate or forcing the 
administrator to establish a reserve against the claim.  If it appears that the primary 
obligor will be able to pay the debt out of its own resources (without requiring a call 
on Acme’s guarantee), then the beneficiary’s claim in Acme’s bankruptcy may be 
estimated at zero or close to it. 
VI.  Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Obligations 
 
How hard would it be to cast the net of a sovereign debt restructuring 
wide enough to catch the sovereign’s contingent obligations? 
(a) Voluntary offers 
If the debt restructuring is conducted as a purely voluntary exchange 
(that is, no use of CACs, embedded or retrofit), and involves delivery of new debt 
instruments of the sovereign in exchange for outstanding sovereign guaranteed 
bonds, the holders of contingent sovereign paper can be expected to ask for a sweeter 
deal than that offered to the direct creditors.  The justification will be that this 
additional consideration is needed to compensate for the creditors’ surrender of a 
claim against the first name (the primary obligor) of their two-name paper.  Apart 
from the politically delicate job of deciding whether the incremental credit risk of a 
parastatal on a debt instrument is worth a nickel or a dime or something more, 
different values would logically need to be assigned for each of the primary obligors, 
a tedious and possibly controversial task. 
The alternative would involve restructuring each guaranteed bond in a 
manner that maintains the primary obligor as the first name on the paper.  This could 
be done either by exchanging each old guaranteed bond for a new guaranteed bond 
with the same parties, or else attempting to modify the terms of that old bond within 
its four corners (no exchange).  This approach would address the concern about the 
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loss of the creditor’s claim against the primary obligor, but it could significantly 
complicate the mechanics of the restructuring.  For one thing, it would be tantamount 
to a separate restructuring for each guaranteed bond.  Because the primary obligors 
would continue as a credit risk on the restructured debt instruments, the securities 
laws in many jurisdictions would require separate disclosure for each of those 
primary obligors in the exchange offer.  Instead of issuing a single series of 
sovereign bonds for exchange with existing debtholders, the restructuring would 
involve the issuance, listing and administration of multiple series of bonds, each 
corresponding to an underlying guaranteed debt instrument. 
(b) Less-than-voluntary offers 
A debt restructuring that does not rely exclusively on persuasion to 
bring creditors into the deal will face its own set of problems with contingent 
sovereign obligations. 
Collective action clauses (CACs).  One immediate question will be 
whether the terms of the guarantee will need to be amended separately from, or in 
parallel with, a modification of the terms of the underlying debt instrument.  If the 
underlying instrument does not include a collective action clause of some kind, its 
amendment -- and the corresponding amendment of the related guarantee -- would 
presumably require the unanimous consent of each debtholder.  Even where the 
underlying debt instrument contains a CAC, however, the related sovereign 
guarantee almost certainly will not.  Our research suggests that CACs are almost 
never incorporated in sovereign guarantees. 
Somewhat more common, but still quite rare, is for the CAC 
appearing in the underlying bond to permit changes to the accompanying sovereign 
guarantee.  As Figure 2 shows, of the guaranteed bonds with CACs in our database, 
fewer than 10% permitted modifications by a supermajority vote of creditors to both 
the underlying bond and the accompanying guarantee. 
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Why should contract drafters who were cautious enough to put CACs 
in their bonds have felt it unnecessary to incorporate a similar feature in the 
accompanying guarantees?  The most plausible explanation is that the drafters 
simply didn’t see the need to do so.  The guarantee promises payment of the bond on 
the dates and in the amounts due.  If the creditors agree to amend the terms of the 
bond, this argument goes, the terms of the guarantee will automatically wrap around 
those modified terms. 
This assumption may be a bit too facile.  For one thing, the wording 
of the guarantee could be crucial.  For example, a Republic of Turkey sovereign 
guarantee in our database recites that: 
The intention and purpose of this Guarantee is to ensure 
that the Bondholders . . . shall receive the amounts 
payable as interest and principal as and when due and 
payable according to the Issue Terms . . .
16
 
                                                 
16
 The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, DM200,000,000 7% Deutsche Mark Bearer Bonds of 
1987/1992, irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed by the Republic of Turkey, (emphasis added). 
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No mention is made of a possible modification to the original Issue Terms.  It is 
therefore not clear whether an amendment to the terms of the underlying bond would 
automatically result in a corresponding amendment to the accompanying guarantee. 
More importantly, the amendment of a sovereign guaranteed bond 
through the use of a collective action clause is still an unusual event and would raise 
novel legal issues. 
If a supermajority of bondholders can alter the terms of an underlying 
bond through a collective action clause, but no similar contractual flexibility exits to 
modify the terms of the related sovereign guarantee, can a disaffected minority of 
bondholders insist on payment by the guarantor of the amounts originally due under 
the bond?  The argument against permitting such a claim focuses on the words of the 
guarantee promising payment “when due” of the primary obligor’s obligations under 
the bond.  If those obligations are extended or reduced in a manner permitted by the 
terms of the bond (through the exercise of the CAC), the argument goes, the 
guarantee should automatically wrap around the amended terms.   
The argument in favor of allowing those disgruntled creditors to insist 
on strict performance of the guarantee has several components.  First, these 
guarantees are often deliberately set up to be free standing, separately enforceable 
instruments; the guarantor is frequently described as being liable as a “primary 
obligor and not merely as surety” of the underlying obligation.  If a supermajority of 
bondholders wish to modify the terms of the underlying obligation, the presence of a 
CAC may allow them to sweep along a disaffected minority at that level.  But absent 
a CAC in the guarantee, the consent of each beneficiary of the guarantee would 
appear to be required to effect a parallel amendment of that instrument.  Second, had 
the drafter of the guarantee wanted to permit its terms to be modified with less than 
the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries, this would have been easy to do.  Under 
normal principles of contract interpretation a court would not read such a 
modification clause into the document.  Finally, many guarantees contain language 
similar to the following: 
The liability of the Guarantor hereunder shall be 
absolute and unconditional irrespective of any change 
in the time, manner or place of payment, or any other 
term of, the [underlying obligation].
17
 
                                                 
17
 This language is included in a guarantee to ensure that the guarantor is not released if the lender 
agrees to vary the terms of the underlying obligation.  See Raymer McQuiston, Drafting an 
Enforceable Guaranty in an International Financing Transaction:  A Lender’s Perspective, 10 INT’L 
TAX AND BUS. LAWYER 138, 156 (1993) (“Common law courts have ruled consistently that a 
variation or change in the terms of the underlying loan agreement without the guarantor’s consent … 
justifies a release of the guarantor from its obligations.”)  That said, a bondholder might argue that the 
language could equally be seen as preserving a bondholder’s claim against the guarantor to perform 
the unamended terms of the underlying instrument unless that lender has also agreed to amend the 
guarantee. 
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This situation (a conflict between a “collective action” amendment of 
an underlying obligation and the modification of an accompanying guarantee) is not 
well developed in U.S. law for the simple reason that collective action modification 
clauses fell out of favor in corporate debt instruments in the United States in the 
1930s, and have only recently (since 2003) begun to appear in sovereign debt 
instruments governed by the law of a U.S. jurisdiction.  In a traditional U.S. 
amendment clause requiring the unanimous consent of all creditors for a change to 
payment terms, the issue does not arise; by definition, every holder will have 
consented to the change. 
Governing law.  A sovereign fortunate enough to have its guarantees 
governed by its own law may (subject to constitutional constraints) be able to 
encourage holders of its contingent obligations to accept a restructuring by 
threatening to pass domestic legislation containing a sentence along these lines: 
All guarantees issued by the Republic of Ruritania in 
respect of debt obligations of third parties that are 
eligible to participate in the [Ruritanian restructuring] 
shall, if called by the beneficiary at any time after the 
closing of the [Ruritanian restructuring], be satisfied 
and discharged in full by delivery to the creditor of 
consideration equivalent to that offered in the 
[Ruritanian restructuring]. 
The effect of such a provision would be to remove any incentive on 
the part of the beneficiary of a state guarantee to refrain from calling on the 
guarantee at the time of the main restructuring.  It is thus a statutory expression of 
the warning that Grenada gave in 2005 to the holders of its contingent obligations 
(see text accompanying footnote 13 above).  In a debt restructuring, a local law 
guarantee thus provides the sovereign with considerable leverage. 
One of the most startling conclusions of our empirical research has 
been the split between the law chosen to govern underlying debt instruments and the 
governing law of the related sovereign guarantee.  Figure 3 suggests that until 2010, 
a significant number of sovereign guarantees were governed by local law (the law of 
the sovereign’s jurisdiction), even where the underlying bond was governed by 
foreign law. 
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This practice shifted abruptly starting in 2010, probably because the 
Greek crisis highlighted the added risks for the holders of debt instruments governed 
by local law.
18
  Post Greece, bondholders were no longer as willing to allow their 
guarantees to be governed by the sovereign’s own law.  This is, we believe, a 
particularly vivid example of documentation practices in cross-border debt 
instruments responding almost immediately to the market’s perception of a new -- or 
in this case, an overlooked – legal risk. 
Waiver of immunity.  All creditors of sovereigns face the daunting 
challenge of enforcing their claims against a recalcitrant debtor, but most benefit 
from an express waiver by the sovereign of any entitlement that the sovereign (or its 
property) may enjoy based on sovereign immunity.  Figure 5 suggests, however, that 
such express waivers of immunity are far less common in sovereign guarantees than 
one might have thought. 
 
                                                 
18
 The Greek Parliament retrofit a collective action mechanism on its local law debt stock in early 
2012 in order to facilitate a restructuring of those obligations.  See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph 
Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy, Duke Law School Working Paper 
(Sept. 11, 2012 draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932  
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The absence of an express waiver of immunity does not make it 
impossible to enforce a guarantee against a defaulting sovereign, but it will make the 
enforcement process more difficult.  Sovereigns can be expected to remind the 
beneficiaries of their guarantees of this likely difficulty as a means of encouraging 
those beneficiaries to join a general restructuring. 
VII.  Conclusion 
Our conclusions are --  
 In a number of important countries, sovereign guarantees have 
become so prevalent that they cannot be ignored in any future debt 
workouts that may be needed for those countries. 
 Exactly how the contingent portion of a sovereign’s debt stock is 
to be addressed in such a restructuring remains a mystery.  There 
are very few precedents and no good precedents. 
 For a while at least (until existing bonds mature and are replaced 
by new issues with more pro-creditor provisions), some 
sovereigns will benefit in a debt restructuring from the 
prelapsarian innocence shown in the contract drafting patterns that 
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prevailed before 2010 in areas such as governing law and waiver 
of immunities. 
 One thing seems certain:  the presence of a significant number of 
contingent liabilities in a sovereign’s debt stock will present major 
complications for the architects of a debt restructuring for that 
country.  Not the least of these will be psychological.  The need to 
address contingent liabilities will force everyone -- creditors, 
official sector sponsors and citizens -- to watch with alarm as 
heretofore off balance sheet liabilities come rushing on to the 
sovereign’s balance sheet, just in time to be restructured. 
* * * * 
 
 
